THEOLOGY

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Editorial

Thoughts in a Straitened Church - - - *Frank Bennett*

Richard Hooker and the Rites of Burial - - *J. G. Davies*

Scepticism and Revelation - - *Martin Jarrett-Kerr, C.R.*

Spiritual Growth - - - - - - - *John Byrom*

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Editorial

IT is ironical that twenty years ago or so some of us were becoming seriously exercised about the problem of "the Leisure State." It was anticipated that in a time that was not very far distant it might be necessary for people to work only about two hours a day. We do not rule out the possibility that a time may yet come when this problem is a real one. For the present, however, it has disappeared over the horizon. In Britain at all events the problem now and for so long a time ahead as we need worry about is how to move people to work harder. One can perceive that much, without professing to understand the mysteries of the financial and economic crisis. There are many problems in the world about which it is difficult to see that the ordinary man can do anything; but here happily is a problem to the solution of which every man can directly contribute, and can contribute every day.

It is not likely that the British people will be moved to work harder by pulpit oratory though, if it comes to that, this is a subject about which clergymen can speak with a sense that their practice is not hopelessly inconsistent with their preaching. There can be few professions whose members on an average put in more hours' work per week. It is not, however, exhortation so much as explanation that is needed. The most effective explanations no doubt will be those which succeed in getting across to the public mind and imagination the reasons why at this juncture in our history harder and better work has become necessary for national survival. The statesman who first explains why it is necessary now for men to do six days' work for five days' pay instead of receiving six days' pay for five days' work will do a great service to his country.

But there are also explanations that need to be made at the theological level. We take here only one example. In recent decades Christians have largely subscribed and pandered to popular illusions about the idea of "vocation." "Each man has his own vocation," said Emerson. "The talent is the call." A man's vocation or a child's vocation was taken to be the occupation in which he could best express himself, for which he was best fitted, from which he would derive most pleasure and satisfaction. There is a great deal of romanticism and, in fact, nonsense in the notion that all men and women should be able to find a job in which they will be able perfectly to express themselves, and that if only careers masters, appointment boards, and vocational psychologists are given free course everyone will be able to find his ideal niche in the social scene.

Certainly it is a good thing that boys and girls should, so far as is possible, be guided to the jobs for which they are best fitted,

among the limited range of jobs that will be open to them. But it is folly to encourage the idea that they will all be able to find complete satisfaction in earthly occupations. The business of keeping this world going always has involved a vast amount of drudgery; it does so at present, and it is always likely to do so. There is an element of drudgery in the most interesting jobs. The most satisfying jobs are in the end unsatisfying. Christian teaching should not conceal this hard and prosaic fact. It has no need to do so, since it does not pretend that the fulfilment of man's destiny lies in this world or in his earthly occupations.

A man's earthly calling is the task appointed by God in which he is to obey Him and serve his brethren. This calling reaches a man normally through the operation of natural causes. For the great majority of mankind the earthly calling is determined within narrow limits by the place and time in which they are born, by heredity and environment, and by the opportunities which the state of society provides. Boys born in mining villages are generally called to be miners, the sons of farmers to be farmers, and so forth; and the exceptions prove the rule.

It is perhaps a misfortune that most of those who write and talk about this subject are themselves exceptions to the rule, and that they are generously inclined to suppose that the comparatively free choice of an occupation which has been possible for them is a universal possibility. This generous impulse blinds them to the fact that the idea of a man's vocation to his earthly work—an idea which is hardly explicit in the Bible, so far as individuals are concerned—does not supersede or abolish the obligation of mankind to do all the ordinary, humdrum jobs that are necessary to maintain the life of the world. A man finds his vocation in doing as well and as cheerfully as he can that part in maintaining the life of the world which is assigned to him, and his assignment is determined within narrow limits by circumstances which he cannot control but which he can accept in terms of his responsibility to God and the neighbour. It is obvious that the life of the world could not go on if every man was at liberty to choose precisely the job which appealed to him most, yet this has been the logical conclusion of the modern romanticism about vocation. Theologians will be doing a useful piece of work if they call this particular piece of bluff.

Thoughts in a Straitened Church

THE first thing to be said about the place of money in the work of the Church is that, as a matter of experience, money occupies a central place. But then there is something further to be said, which is apt to sound more questionable—that this is a place which money ought to occupy. For it is through the exigencies that God shapes and moulds us, often to the outraging of our own wisdom, but also addresses us and issues His commands. We may wish that it were otherwise; we may wish that God were a Manichean—one often does. But, in fact, we live in a world which He created, and saw that it was good, and everything in which is due for transfiguration in the new heaven and the new earth by consummation in Jesus Christ. Thus money, as the symbol under which man exercises his dominion over the works of God's hands, is sacred—not, of course, just Church money, but all money—and all money, including Church money, is a theological subject. The trouble is not that the Church is too much interested in money; in many ways it is too little interested in money. The trouble is that it is interested in money in isolation from the ends for which the Church exists. Money-raising becomes an end in itself, a veritable obsession, the criterion of success, and the Church presents itself both to its own people and to the world in general as primarily an organization for raising money to keep the Church going. But this is the result, not of too much, but of too little thought given to the subject. It is naïve. The finance lacks depth exactly because it is not geared into the worship, the *koinonia*, the Gospel-preaching (a robust and Anglo-Saxon term surely to be preferred to the hackneyed and Hellenistic term, evangelism!).

Finance becomes a special subject. One result of this is the notion that it should be left to the laity, who are often very bad at finance. Far worse, Church finance comes to be scarcely differentiated from the world's finance and it should be different, not because the world's finance is wicked (which, like the Church's, it often is), but because everything about the Church should be different, should have a risen-life quality and another goal. The goal is the great matter. Church finance can affect the whole direction of those who participate in it. Finance can teach, and to-day it becomes clear that, for the most part, effective teaching has to be given indirectly by patient suggestion rather than by formal instruction. Finance can give expression to the life of a body of Christ, as St Paul can call a Local Church—to the life of a parish or of what in an episcopal Church is the true Local Church, a diocese. Now this is the first and chief thing that may trouble a present-day pastor—not that he has to concern himself with finance, but that he seems continually to be involved in such aimless finance, in finance which is totally uninterested in the question of what the Church is. One symptom of this state of affairs is the lay-out of many Church reports. There is part 1, a statement of needs; then comes part 2, some paragraphs or pages of uplift. Now part 2 does almost always fall into our besetting sin

of cliché-ridden uplift, and this is exactly because it is part 2 and has not subjected itself to the discipline of consorting with part 1.

Paul can use grand language about his collection for Jerusalem, startlingly grand language, but he uses it about the collection, not all round and about it. This Paul is indeed the most subtle of pastors. And because his administration, in this as in everything, is expressive of the corporate life in Christ, he can be bold. Surely we shall continue to shiver, as shiver we do, until we get beyond the stage of just saying a collect at the beginning and end of the finance meeting—until the finance itself is impregnated with theological truth and pastoral strategy. It has to be considered, not merely how much we need and how it can be sought, but how it ought to be sought by Christians and from what quarters, and what methods will conduce to "fellowship in furtherance of the gospel." Is there perhaps money which ought not to be sought because it is unassociated with self-giving in worship? Is there money which ought not to be sought because it may only be had by our presenting ourselves to the world, not as preachers of the Gospel, but as propagators of some heresy called "spiritual values"? Is there money which ought to be sought very cautiously because it may lead flesh to glory in itself in God's presence? Questions of this kind are seldom asked, yet surely they are the sort of questions that we should be examining as a prerequisite of Christian procedure. Money is of so profound a significance that mishandling at this level can distort both the inward vitals and the outward face of the Church. There are Scriptures to be searched, there is thinking to be done, there are insights to be put into practice.

Now this will not be easy in a Church which, on the one hand, can hardly meet together in a social way save "in aid of" something, and in which, on the other hand, avowedly sacramentalist clergymen dismiss the alms dish from the Lord's Table as though it had contracted some unholy contagion. We have to show that the Church is not an organization for erecting and by all means maintaining church halls, but also we have to show that it has not forgotten that the Son of God has been made "flesh." We have, in other words, both to cry up and to cry down money. We have to accept the needs as sent by God, and under His word to manipulate them to the building up, in love and in truth, of His human temple. But then there is a word which is not often heard to-day, that He will provide—or maybe He will not, for He may well shape us into an instrument suitable to new times by withholding supplies. Certainly we are likely to live in a state of faithless teeth-chattering unless we are prepared for that. Already we live in a haunted Church. The spectre of vague but formidable sums of money, needed for a bewildering variety of purposes, haunts our waking hours, but this is in large part because we put off the facing of facts.

For to say that God will provide is not to say that we should look the other way. Least of all is it to say that we should be haphazard. Rather it will be an act of faithful obedience to cut the coat according to the cloth, since it is in God's work-room that we tailor and He

is the Managing Director. Yet we are haunted, and to be haunted is mighty inimical both to efficiency and true religion. Is it not a case that we shall continue to be haunted until it is frankly recognized by the whole Church of England that the next quarter-century, maybe the next decade, is going to work a catastrophic but, as one must firmly believe, saving revolution in our set-up? This is another discouragement that worries many a pastor, that he seems continually to be dedicated to shoring up undertakings and plant in the future of which he can have no belief. It is indeed a predicament from which we cannot altogether escape, but it is unnerving at this date to hear our difficulties attributed, as still they often are, to the war, as though all that were necessary were a tiding over. One has no stomach for helping to raise money for any continuation of that policy. Truth to tell, there is a greater lack of imagination and adaptability even than of money, and this in turn dries up the flow of financial support. We live in a straitened Church considerably because it is a Church which has ceased to interest and is itself losing heart. For refurbishing is a poor business, and this poor Church of England cries out for something at once more invigorating and more commensurate with drastic times.

Altogether more is needed than efforts at money-raising. Concurrently with them must go creative adaptation and chiefly a fuller and better-designed exploiting of human resources. For apart from this the financial demands assume proportions that cease to be challenging and become merely dispiriting. But also such adaptation may under God provide the necessary fillip. It is exciting to create. Perhaps it is largely to re-creation that we are called—to the re-creation of the order of the laity, to the re-creation of the diaconate. God drives us back upon our true pattern who have become unduly clerical. To look at the matter thus is surely to look at it the right way round—constructively, theologically. If there is an order of laity to be restored to its due place in the Church, this will be achieved, not by exhortation, but in the first place by considering its functions, and not least its liturgical functions. Those who are made to remain spectators in the assembly are likely to remain spectators outside it. If there is to be a permanent diaconate, this can be made the means of recovering a genuine diaconate, for our present birds of passage to the priesthood can hardly be so described. Not that a part-time priesthood is to be excluded, but the need for a part-time clergy can be interpreted in more invigorating terms than those of mere improvisation. Certainly it becomes a clamant need, and already a disorderly situation arises through the assumption that the charisma of ordination is needed for the administration of sacraments but not for the preaching of the word.

As to the full-time clergy, should not these be selected and trained with an eye on the shape of the Church which we may conceivably expect to see emerging? Is not our notion of a clergyman still too Trollopian? There are employments and positions in the Church for which a degree should be regarded as a necessary qualification —such discrimination would be a return to former practice. There

are also posts for which, quite seriously, a degree might be regarded as a disqualification. Once the clergy of the Church of England were *Stupor Mundi*. We can hardly claim the title now in its original sense, but certainly many of us with our academic background succeed in leaving our people wondering.

In brief, a few bold strokes might not only go far to solving our problems. They might not only awaken the Church to the futility of a state of affairs by which harassed parish clergy are required by custom to waste themselves striving to keep going programs devised by their more numerous predecessors. A few bold strokes in those matters of practice which catch the imagination more than the most winged of words might bring this Church of England to brace its agitated limbs and rub its sleepy eyes and show the world that at least one institution has really left the nineteenth century behind. The sort of woes that are commonly canvassed in the parishes—some timid addition to the diocesan quota—are but symptoms of a deeper malaise—of a suspicious and disheartened Church. But if this melting pot in which we find ourselves may once be seen and taken as God's melting pot, and therefore a place of opportunity, then a new spirit will take hold of us and not least will this affect our ponderous finances.

FRANK BENNETT.

Richard Hooker and the Rites of Burial

ON the title-page of the anonymous tract which was published in 1599 as a critique of his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Richard Hooker wrote these words: "All things written in this book I humbly and meekly submit to the censure of the grave and reverend Prelates within this land, to the judgment of learned men, and the sober consideration of all others. Wherein I may haply err as others before me have done, but an heretic by the help of Almighty God I will never be." Needless to say the arbitrament to which he appealed was strongly in his favour and the greatness of Hooker's achievement, above all the validity of his appeal to antiquity, may be assessed by the fact that to-day, despite a hundred years' intensive patristic study consequent upon the Oxford Movement, little of what he wrote needs to be in any way revised or altered. Admittedly his defence of pluralities and the lack of learning among ministers, in the last chapter of his Fifth Book, smacks of special pleading, but apart from this and one other section his high standard of accurate scholarship is preserved throughout. This other section is that in which he is concerned with the rites of burial (Chap. LXXV), and he seems to have been surprisingly ignorant of early Christian practice.

The Puritans objected to the wearing of "mourning apparel" at funerals on the grounds that it was either hypocritical when no sorrow was felt or dangerous where there was true grief since it only served to intensify it beyond measure. In his answer Hooker applies his first and second general principles. The first is that those

religious ceremonies and observances which can be shown to be fitted to set forward godliness are to be reverenced (VI, 2). So Hooker, having defined one of the purposes of funeral duties to be "to show that love towards the party deceased which nature requireth," asserts that "for signification of love towards them that are departed mourning is not denied to be a thing convenient" (LXXV, 2). Just as white garments are fitted for marriage feasts and such other times of joy, so mourning apparel is most suitable for funerals. His second axiom is that those religious ceremonies and observances which are commended by the judgment of antiquity and by the long-continued practice of the whole Church are to be reverenced (VII, 1). Accordingly he points out how David covered his head and wept at the treachery of Absalom, and how our Lord Himself shed tears at the death of Lazarus. Finally he cryptically affirms, not without a touch of humour, that the danger of excess of sorrow is not very great for "it doth not come oftentimes to pass that men are fain to have their mourning gowns pulled off their backs for fear of killing themselves with sorrow that way nourished" (LXXV, 2).

Neither Hooker nor his Puritan opponents seem to have been aware that there were very good grounds for objecting to the use of mourning apparel and to the uttering of lamentation also. The practice of the early Church in this respect was very different from what was usual in Hooker's day, and for that matter from what is witnessed in the twentieth century, as a brief description of the rites will make evident.

As soon as the soul had quitted the body and the priest had concluded the noble words of the *ordo commendationis animæ*, the eyes of the deceased were closed (Eus. *H.E.* vii, 22), the corpse was washed (Ter. *Apol.* xlii), then anointed with balm and myrrh (Prudentius, *Cathemerinon, hymn* x, 51), and finally wrapped in white linen cloths.

The clergy, flanked by acolytes swinging thuribles smoking with incense,[1] headed the funeral procession, which sang hymns and psalms, the chanting being punctuated by great shouts of "Alleluia" (Jerome *Ep.* LXXVII) and the intoning of versicles by one of the ministers—"Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord" and "I will fear no evil, for Thou art with me" (Chryst. *Hom.* IV *in Hebr.*). The body of the deceased lay on a bier supported by white-robed friends and relations, others of whom carried flaming torches and waved palm branches. On arrival at the cemetery the body was placed by the side of the open tomb and the requiem began.[2] After the Eucharist, the deceased was saluted with the final kiss of peace (Ambr. *de Excessu Sat.* 17; Pseudo-Dion. *de Eccl. Hier.* vii, 8) and laid to rest strewn with flowers which represented the joyful garden

[1] For the use of incense at funerals *vide* Ter. *de Idolat.* xi; *Apol.* xlii; Chryst. *Hom.* 1 *de St Pelagia*; Hilarius of Arles, *Sermo de vita St Honorati*, viii.

[2] Requiems were held from an early date, Ter. *de Corna*, iii; *de Exhort. Cast.* ii; *de Monag.* x; Cyprian, *Ep.* lxv, 2; they were held in cemeteries, *Didasc.* vi. 2; at the same time as the burial, Eus. *Vit. Const.* iv. 71; before the body was laid in the tomb, Aug. *Confess.* ix. 12.

of paradise (*Martyr. St Perpetuæ* IV, 1). The ceremony was concluded with the agape, which, as the catacomb frescoes reveal, was considered to correspond directly with the feast of the elect in paradise; triclinia were often provided for this gathering, one in the vestibule of the catacomb of Domitilla still being extant.

The note of joy was present throughout, and the funeral cortège, decked in white garments, had the character of a triumphal procession, with good reason since all those taking part believed that "death is swallowed up in victory" (1 *Cor.* xv, 54). This day was looked upon as the birthday of the deceased, his *natalis*, the day on which he was born into eternity, a conception appearing in many of the catacomb inscriptions—*e.g.*, NATVIS EST LAURENTIVS IN ETERNVM ANN XX · DORMIT IN PACE.[1] Other epitaphs express the confidence that he lives in God (*vivet in Deo*), in the glory of God (*in gloria Dei*), and that he has gone before us in peace (*præcessit nos in pace*). This same confidence and this same absence of grief is expressed repeatedly in the writings of the Fathers. Thus Origen affirms: "We do not celebrate the day of a man's birth, as it is only the commencement of pains and trials, but we celebrate the day of his death because it is the putting away of all pains and the escape from all temptations. We celebrate the day of death because those who seem to die do not really die. For that reason we both make memorials of the saints and also devoutly commemorate our parents and friends who die in faith, both rejoicing over their state of refreshment and also entreating for ourselves a pious consummation in faith" (*Comm. in Job*).[2] St Cyprian declares: "Our brethren who are freed from this world by the Lord's summons are not to be lamented, since we know that they are not lost, but sent before; that, departing from us, they precede us as travellers, as navigators are accustomed to do; that they should be desired, but not bewailed; that the black garments should not be taken upon us here, when they have already taken upon them white raiment there; that occasion should not be given to the Gentiles for them deservedly and rightly to reprehend us, that we mourn those, who, we say, are alive with God, as if they were extinct and lost. . . . Finally, the Apostle Paul reproaches, and rebukes, and blames any who are in sorrow at the departure of their friends. 'I would not,' says he, 'have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others who have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them which are asleep in Jesus will God bring with Him' " (*de Mortal.* XX, XXI). The attitude of St Jerome, over a century later, is the same: "Under Jesus, that is, under the Gospel of Christ, who has unlocked for us the gate of paradise, death is accompanied, not with sorrow, but with joy," since "Christ has broken open the door of paradise, and quenched with His blood the flaming sword and the whirling of the guardian cherubim" (*Ep.* XXXIX).

[1] W. H. Withrow, *The Catacombs of Rome*, 1890, p. 423.
[2] Quoted in *Liturgy and Society*, 1943, pp. 616 f.

The distinctive character of early Christian burial rites is made even more plain by its contrast with pagan funerals.

At the moment of death the eyes and mouth of the deceased were closed (Virg. *Æn.* ix, 487), and the *clamatio*, the lamentations of the relatives and friends began (Ovid. *Trist.* iii, 3, 43), while the corpse was washed, anointed, and laid on a couch in the atrium. The pollution of death had now affected the house, which became *funesta*, *i.e.*, in a state of taboo, and in order to prevent anyone from approaching cypress branches were hung outside. The funeral itself took place at night, at least in the days of the Republic; under the emperors, children and the poor continued to be hurried to their rest in the darkness, but the rich and noble were afforded a great public display. At the head of the procession were the musicians playing mournful tunes (Cic. *de Leg.* ii, 23); next came the women whose profession it was to lament and to sing the funeral song (*nænia*); they were followed by the freedmen (Dionys. iv, 24) and by a group wearing masks to represent the ancestors of the deceased. The corpse, carried on a bier or couch by hired bearers, preceded the relatives dressed in black (Juv. x, 45); their hair and beards were uncut, their ornaments were discarded (Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 14), while the sons walked with veiled heads and the daughters with hair dishevelled and uncovered. The groans and cries were continuous, the women beating their breasts and tearing their cheeks, although forbidden to do so by the Twelve Tables. The last rites took place either at a private mausoleum, if the deceased were rich, or by a large public grave, if he were poor. Under the early empire cremation was widespread, but this was discontinued with the growth of Christianity, falling into disuse in the fourth century (Macrob. vii, 7). The ritual of interment was quite simple, consisting frequently of nothing more than the sprinkling of the mourners with water from a branch of olive or laurel to purify them from contamination (Virg. *Æn.* vi, 229); as they left the tomb they bade farewell with the word "Vale." On their return to the house, they underwent further purificatory ceremonies and the mourning continued for nine days longer, culminating in a sacrifice (Porphyr. *ad Horat. Epod.* xvii, 48). Feasts were often given in honour of the dead, and among the tombs at Pompeii there is a triclinium especially intended for this purpose; the day on which it took place is uncertain, sometimes on the day of the funeral, sometimes later.

Many epitaphs bear clear witness to the pagan horror of death and to their hopeless grief at the loss of the departed—*e.g.*, DIIS INIQVIS ANIMVLAM TVAM RAPVERVNT, or VALE ÆTERNVM.[1]

It is hardly necessary to point out that both Elizabethan funerals and those which take place to-day have much more in common with those of pagan Rome than with those of the early Church. However successfully Hooker may have dealt with the specific Puritan objections, he failed for once to base his argument on the testimony of antiquity and by so doing prevented the focusing of attention on one aspect of Church Polity which was in sore need of reformation.

[1] Withrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 440 f.

The principal reason for the regrettable transformation which has taken place in funeral practices would appear to be the development of the doctrine of purgatory; the pains depicted in the stained-glass windows and emphasized in the inflammatory eloquence of the medieval period invested death with a terror and an uncertainty which shattered the primitive joy and confidence in the risen Lord. So although in the Gelasian and Gregorian Sacramentaries all the prayers are prayers for final bliss, in the York use there is the petition: "Loose him, and deliver him from the cruel fire of the boiling pit." The idea of avenging judgment which finds its supreme expression in the *Dies Iræ* became predominant, and though the incense and torches remained the funeral procession ceased to be a triumphal march and became instead a sorrowing cortège singing the penitential psalms. The mournful effect of the funeral was intensified by the repetition of the Mass and Vigils of the Dead on the third, ninth, and thirtieth days following.

In the twentieth century it is more a lack of faith in God than anything else that leads to the erecting of broken pillars over the graves of the departed and to the black clothes and the copious lamentations. Even amongst the faithful adherents of the Church of England, which repudiates, at least in its medieval caricature, the doctrine of purgatory, there are few who would assert without hesitation that they will be admitted into the bliss of heaven—to make such an assertion would seem to them an act of pride. It may, however, legitimately be maintained that to refuse to confess such a belief is lacking in humility, for the Christian who affirms his faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, in the resurrection of the body, and in a merciful God who loves His sinful creatures, should be confident that he will enter heaven, not because he has for one moment deserved or in any way earned it by his own efforts, but because of that same Lord whose death is both a proclamation of the Divine love and the means of forgiveness of sin.

Amidst so much that seems nearer to paganism than to Christianity, it can be admitted with gratification that the 1662 Rite of Burial made a distinct advance on its medieval predecessors, in that the emphasis has been moved from judgment to the power of Christ's resurrection; it is to be hoped that the parochial clergy, by their patient teaching, may bring about a corresponding transformation of the conduct and apparel of those who make use of it.

J. G. Davies.

Scepticism and Revelation

Sooner or later it was bound to happen. Those acquainted with the movements of modern philosophy will know that the most vigorous thinking and the closest reasoning to be found in any one school, on the Continent, in England, and increasingly in America, has been that associated with what is now usually called over here "logical positivism." This school, building as it does admittedly

upon the older empiricism, with assistance from discoveries in modern logic, has been the most powerful and certainly the most vocal in rejecting all "metaphysics." Philosophical theologians have not been slow to observe that this rejection, carrying with it the rejection of ethics and æsthetics, has the effect of undermining all attempts at a "natural theology." Kant, having "disposed of" the natural theology of the classical Middle Ages, left us with only one proof for the existence of God: the Moral. The grandsons of Hume, the logical empiricists (as they are better called) now set to, to dispose of this proof. Thus none of the traditional arguments to theism is left standing. (For the *a priori* argument "disappeared" earlier still.)

Meanwhile another attack was developing from another side. The recovery of Reformed Theology, with Dr Karl Barth marching in the front row but a considerable army behind, discovered that one of its major tasks involved the demolition of all natural theology too. No doubt among the followers there have been occasional discordant voices: a surreptitious attempt here and there, for instance, to build a sort of natural theology, not upon what the modern logical empiricists had swept away, but upon existential insights, so interpreted as to elude the broom of positivism and in one case (Dr Brunner) a gradual return to something not easy to distinguish from the philosophical theism of axiologists like the late Dr A. E. Taylor. But Barth himself never wavered, and those most fully in the reformed tradition are still at one with him in the rejection of all attempts to prove God's existence from the evidence provided *ex hoc sæculo*.

Therefore someone was bound sooner or later to examine this strange convergence; to peep under the blanket and then assess what necessity it was that could have made such strange bedfellows. Indeed, it is a wonder it has not been done sooner. But it has been done at last, and in a book which, since it is not easily obtainable in this country, I propose to give some account of.[1] W. F. Zuurdeeg, *A Research for the Consequences of the Vienna Circle Philosophy for Ethics* (Kemink en Zoon N.V.—Over Den Dom—Utrecht. N.p. 1946). The book, unfortunately, has been translated by someone who knows very little English, and therefore in places it is almost impossible to tell exactly what the author's reasoning is. But it is of sufficient intrinsic value to be worth consideration. Perhaps some English publisher would obtain the original and have it translated for an authentic English edition.

Dr Zuurdeeg tells us that he is a pastor in one of the smaller Protestant churches in the Netherlands, of "De Remonstrantsche Broedershcap." Liberal theology in Protestantism, he says, found its bearings in German Idealism: "Some theologians turned to Hegel, others to Kant, the Neo-Kantians, especially to Troeltsch. Among the younger theologians there are those who belong to the Pheno-

[1] Reviewed by G. E. Hughes, Esq., in *Philosophy*, June, 1947. I am indebted to Mr Hughes for loan of the book.

menological School"—the school, that is, of such as Brentano and Husserl, out of which grew the Existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre. But, he says, "I cannot agree with this way of thinking any longer. For the philosophical questions we shall have to follow, in my opinion, Hume more than Kant" (p. 139). And so he sets out to examine the work of three in particular of the "Vienna Circle" of logical empiricists, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, and Richard von Mises. And when he comes to state his own view, over against theirs, he admits frankly that if he were asked with which view of life he agreed, that of the Vienna Circle or of the Idealists, he would place himself, even though with some reserve, on the side of the Vienna Circle. "I do not believe in *veritates æternæ* and absolute rules any more than the Neo-positivists do, nor in *Reiner Vernunft* nor in moral intuition. I do not agree with the rather generally held opinion that Idealism has great affinity with religion, because it speaks of a 'higher world.' I do not believe in a higher world, but in God, and that is something quite different! In the domain of the view on world and man, I am an ally of the Vienna Circle. I esteem it to be one of the greatest merits of the Vienna Circle that they continuously urge it on us to cherish modest expectations of our own capacities . . ." (p. 144). And, indeed, as if this were not paradoxical enough, he claims, as we shall see, that the real defect of the logical empiricists is that they do not go far enough! The theology of Revelation can out-scepticize the sceptics.

It would be out of place, except in a technically philosophical journal, to discuss his examination of the Vienna Circle in any detail. But one or two general conclusions may be indicated. In the first place, he detects considerable divergencies even between the three whom he discusses. It is Otto Neurath, he finds, who is the most radical in his refusal of metaphysics, von Mises is the most moderate, while Moritz Schlick occupies a peculiar kind of mid-way position (p. 50). On the other hand it is Neurath who reckons Marxism to be the really scientific sociology, and finds Marx and Engels alone among sociologists to be "free from metaphysics"; whereas von Mises rejects this identification (p. 127). Moreover, Schlick commits the unpardonable sin of writing a book on Ethics: most of the Neo-positivists, he says, "do not write such books; they do not even mention ethical subjects in their books and papers, and restrict themselves to logic, logistics, epistemology, analysis of language and a philosophical treatment of some mathematical and physical problems (p. 141). And there is even a divergence about the meaning of "meaningless" as applied to metaphysical statements. One of the Vienna Circle, Karl Menger, sees in the proposition "this or that is meaningless" a metaphysical statement; a man who makes a statement of that sort "resembles the man who, having thrown his enemy into a swamp, jumps into the swamp himself with a dagger in his hand." And so Menger himself simply refuses to enter into discussion with people who use metaphysical terms (p. 65). In general, the attitude of the Vienna Circle to ethics and sociology is that, since there are no "general rules or norms," and since all ethics are

relative, the philosopher (or logician: for the two are identical) must be content with description. As Schlick says, the trouble with the older utilitarian is that he tended to turn his statements of the utilitarian principle into a demand—viz., the demand of making public well-being the highest goal of our actions. Whereas the real empiricist should merely make factual statements about what society considers to be "good," which can be gathered from the claims that society actually makes upon its members—"In human society that is called 'good' which society *believes* will bring the most happiness" (p. 120). And yet Schlick himself concludes his book on Ethics with an encomium of goodness, joy, and spontaneity, and with a hymn, rewritten from Kant's hymn in praise of duty:

Song of Praise of Goodness

Goodness, thou lovely and lofty Name!
which containest nothing severe,
which dost not insist upon respect without love,
which dost not demand compliance but implorest it,
which dost not threaten and need not impose laws,
but findest of itself entrance to our hearts and minds,
and which we worship willingly,
the smile of which disarms all other passions, thy sisters.
Thou art so glorious, that we need not ask thine origin,
For whatever may be thy parentage,
It is ennobled by Thee. (Quoted p. 129.)

This religious lyric would appear to be so full of metaphysical terms that it is no wonder that the rest of the Vienna Circle see in Schlick's attitude "a genuflexion before metaphysics" (p. 140).

In his criticism of these representatives of the Circle, Dr Zuurdeeg makes the following points. The selection of the empirical (or as he prefers to call it, "empiristic") standpoint is itself an act of decision. Just as in the process of induction the scientist must at a certain point make a personal decision, so that a non-logical element enters into the method (p. 60), so with the choice of a philosophical method. Moreover, the Neo-positivists themselves admit that the growth of science is due to man's need to "find his place in the world" (von Mises and Schlick: "Sich in seiner Umwelt zurechtfinden") (p. 82). So that the whole philosophical enterprise, with the scientific method behind it, sets off from a non-logical premise. And Dr Zuurdeeg even detects, in their reading of history, a mythology which is an imitation of the theological interpretation. Neurath, for instance, "accepts a first stage—viz., a period of magic in which the mind of man is directed to earthly and finite things. After that, theology spoils things. . . . A great deal of misery ensues, before theology and its ally, metaphysics, can be conquered by empirical science. . . . It is striking how Neurath's picture of history resembles that of Christianity. He also speaks of a fall into sin, and likewise contemplates a future in which all evil—viz., all metaphysical thinking—will be overcome" (p. 84). Zuurdeeg suggests that an important influence upon the Vienna Circle as a whole has been the "Roman Catholic character of Vienna"; this not only explains

their anti-clericalism, so that "theologian" becomes a term of abuse with them: it is also evidenced in the fact that, for instance, von Mises regards "believing" and "accepting as true" as equivalents ("a typically Roman Catholic idea!"). It is curious, too, that Neurath draws up a list of "metaphysical" terms which must be eliminated from philosophy—"Similar to the Roman Catholic Church, he keeps an Index Verborum prohibitorum" (p. 190, n.). But his main accusations against the Vienna Circle are that they unconsciously build upon metaphysical assumptions—"the Vienna Circle is really living on that which it asserts has been eliminated, morals, appreciations, view on life, metaphysics. Their world-view belongs to the heart of their philosophy, the hedonistic morals with Schlick; the idea that life may be ordered by scientific rules with Neurath and von Mises" —and, in general, "materialism, relativism, naturalism, evolutionism, and humanism" (pp. 155-6). And, perhaps even more important, they atomize human existence. "They all attach a more important role to society in theory than we do; they do not speak of God and personality. Ethics becomes sociology. . . . But all this is theory. The forms of social life do not *live* in their ethics, they do not form a living reality, no real concrete values. . . . The Vienna Circle philosophy intentionally eliminates the personal 'I,' but also the 'we' and the 'you' have disappeared. It is peculiar that the Vienna Circle speak of the *utterances* of human intelligence and not of the *communications* one man gives to another. There is no 'you' to whom our utterances are directed. The Vienna Circle ethics, though calling itself sociology, ignores to a very important degree the fact that man is a social being. He makes him an abstraction, an individual with only environment as a background. He is not a person, forming part of a *societas,* but an individual—*i.e.,* an element in the cosmos. . . ." (p. 212). Zuurdeeg thinks that they are right to say that we get our moral rules from society—that the significance of personality is overestimated when we talk about a "moral sense," moral intuition, or "Wesensschau." But they go too far when they completely eliminate personality.

So Zuurdeeg sums up his study by saying that the Vienna Circle philosophy is of great value to the theologian "on account of its relativistic view on life, its analysis of language, its aversion to partial science and philosophy, and its empirical-empiristic method in ethics." It is "a phase in the emancipation of the medieval society which existed under the authority of the Church," and its sober view of man, resulting from its relativism, is "joined closely to the religious one" (pp. 236-8). There is "an unmistakable affinity between Positivism and radical Protestantism" (p. 159), for "he who worships absolute norms, or the Universal Reason, who believes in the hierarchy of values, defies God" (p. 158). Indeed, the only trouble about the logical empiricists is that they do not go far enough! "The radical Neo-positivist philosophy is not radical enough. There is not a single reason why all things should not be submitted to criticism" (p. 162). There is one element which is not subjected to criticism by them; man and his science. "Criticism is radically carried through

to the end only in a radical Protestantism. It says that absolute security cannot be found in any of the earthly data: not in a Church, neither in the Bible, in a dogma or confession, in metaphysics, absolute norms, truths or values, neither in 'moral dignity' or 'l'honnête homme,' because all these things are under the judgment of God" (p. 162).

Dr Zuurdeeg states the "radical Protestant" position, but does not attempt to defend it, apart from saying that it is the most radical of all positions. So that he does not give us much of a clue how he would counter the charge of a logical empiricist who should say—as indeed, they are wont to do—that the term "God" is meaningless, or that a phrase like "to be under the judgment of God" is a metaphysical statement and therefore out-of-bounds. He makes the acute observation that the Positivists suffer from a sort of anxiety-complex. One of them, for instance (Dr Waismann), says that their search is for "an objective, undogmatical philosophy, which cannot possibly have any opponents because it does not 'assert' anything"; but to attempt, thus, to build a "reliable 'bombproof' philosophy and science" is, says Zuurdeeg, to shrink from life, to be scared of committing oneself to anything that cannot be logically justified (pp. 174-5). And so he offers us faith instead, and declares that life is essentially committal, willingness to make evaluations, to take up a certain standpoint. ("I think that this is true, even when we speak in a purely biological way. A living being which shows neither preference nor disapproval is doomed to perish.") But to defend this position requires more discussion than Zuurdeeg gives it. It requires an examination of the relationship between logic (the sort of critical logic he approves in the Vienna Circle) and "decision"; and also an explanation of how radical Protestantism can distinguish between the sort of decision for "values" and so forth (those things which lie under the judgment of God) and decision for revelation (which alone is privileged, apparently, to escape the logical critique). By calling attention to the element of decision there is in all life, Zuurdeeg has, in fact, whether he meant to or no, given us a new sort of *analogia entis*, an analogical scale of self-committal; and this might well be the back door to a new kind of natural theology, less pretentious than the old, but still alien to the claims of radical Protestantism.

What is interesting to observe is that this emphasis upon "decision" is precisely the emphasis which is characteristic of at least one element—and I would say the most respectable element—in so-called "existential" philosophy. Zuurdeeg does not mention the existentialists (except to reject phenomenology, which is a very different matter); but there is no doubt that the Vienna Circle, with whom he is so much in sympathy, would dismiss them as merely another kind of metaphysician. If pragmatism is, in a neat phrase of Fr Casserley's, "merely a timid existentialism," then perhaps the "sober" relativism which Zuurdeeg says is the most valuable contribution of the Vienna Circle, is pointing the way to a deployment of existentialist forces upon the philosophical and apologetic field. It

is certain that only with a total doctrine of man can Christians meet the acids of critical positivism. It is the merit of Dr Zuurdeeg to have seen this, but we shall need more than the rather tenuous fideism, which is in the end his only positive affirmation, to expound and defend that doctrine.

MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

Spiritual Growth

"THE whole life of a Christian man," said Augustine, "is an holy desire. What you long for as yet you do not see . . . by withholding of the vision God extends the longing, through longing He extends the soul, by extending it, He makes room in it. . . . So, brethren, let us long, because we are to be filled. . . . That is our life, to be exercised by longing" (in Ep. Jo. Tr. 4, 6). Thus the union of the soul with God, which is the concern of Mystical Theology, and the end of all human existence, is achieved, or rather granted, by giving, throughout life and in every department of life, the freest play to this loving desire, kindled as it is by the attraction of God's grace exerted on the soul by every means at His disposal. The following, therefore, is an attempt to mark the stages of growth by which the soul arrives at this goal; with particular reference to prayer, in which the life of the spirit tends to find its most characteristic expression.

The first beginnings of the soul's growth are exceedingly obscure, as secret and difficult to trace as a plant's gropings towards the light above the surface of the soil. But on these, nevertheless, depend the quality and direction of all subsequent development. Thus for several years, presuming the home is Christian, the sense of God's existence and authority is mediated to the child mainly through the "must" and "must not" of parental control, and the extent to which the parents themselves submit to the laws which they lay down for the child. The vague unqualified answer "It's wrong" to the child's query about the rightness of some contemplated action, though by no means always a good answer, does nevertheless have the merit of conveying to the child the notion of a law of right and wrong, as well as of a Lawgiver, to which and to whom its all-knowing parents as well as itself are subject. God comes to be thought of mainly as the authority behind the moral law, the living authority who lends validity and urgency to the distinction between right and wrong. And we may say that in a very large majority of cases "religion," until the end of adolescence, or thereabouts, means the struggle to meet the requirements of this moral law. Before adolescence, however, the sense of right and wrong comes to the child somewhat piecemeal through its parents or teachers, while during this phase the sense of God's authority is mediated directly and vividly through the conscience. There is a persistently conscious desire to please a holy God, and all adherence to convention as the motive of the moral life is given up.

Yet strong though this desire is, its Object is no more than vaguely conceived. In some mysterious way God hides Himself or reveals Himself anonymously under the guise of conscience, and leads the soul through the years to a point where He can make Himself known more clearly and more richly and more inwardly. There is little or no clear perception of the idea of personality in God. For years He presents Himself to the mind or soul simply as a relentless overseer whose continuous demand is obedience to conscience in all circumstances and at any cost. Indeed, in times of crisis, the fear of losing interior peace through a wrong decision can be so strong that the mind is hardly conscious of God at all, but only of the necessity of interpreting correctly what conscience is saying. So that the spiritual life resolves itself into little more than a continuous following of a more or less obscure light, always there, but sometimes illuminating no more than the place where the feet are about to tread. Hooker describes it vividly in the first Book of the Ecclesiastical Polity (XI, 4). "Somewhat it (the soul) seeketh," he says, "and what that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentive desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire." And so it is. "We love we know not what," said Traherne. God is perceived very dimly but felt and desired strongly, and all that tends to obliterate this secret sense and scent of Him in the conscience is instinctively given up. There may be an institutional life of ordinary church-going and sermon-hearing, and there may even be a sacramental life going on at the same time; indeed, unknown to the soul, these may be the main stimulus behind its obedience to conscience. Nevertheless, the place of the Sacraments in the scheme of redemption is often but dimly understood, while the Christ of the Scriptures seems immeasurably remote, and prayer is no more than a rudimentary form of confession, intercession, and petition at the bedside. The dominant note is still this unquestioning, often blind, obedience to conscience as the way to salvation.

But sooner or later this ceases. God rewards the soul for its former loyalty, very frequently towards the close of adolescence, by bringing it into a clearing, filling it with light, and revealing Himself no longer as the distant God of the moral conscience, but as deeply personal, as joy, as light, and especially as love. He begins to reveal His Name, His Identity; and the lines of His Personality take shape in the mind. And with this there slowly springs up in the mind what Lady Julian described as "a holy marvelling delight in God," a delight which penetrates every department of life, overflowing sometimes into the body, and producing at times a sensation of intense physical well-being.

Altogether, there is a strong desire to know God; to penetrate His secrets by the aid of this new light which God has granted to the soul as a result of its obedience in the past. There is a new desire to understand the Christian religion both intellectually and inwardly, and to grasp the interconnexion of its parts. Above all, there is a new desire for that sanctity, tranquillity, and union with

God's will which by this newly given light it perceives in others. And with this desire comes the realization that its present habits are not adequate to raise it to perfection. Something is felt to be missing from its life. And thus it comes about, in various ways, through sermons, through reading, in conversation, or by direct supernatural illumination, that the soul literally stumbles upon the discovery that the way to this deeper union it desires is regular solitary prayer. And one may say that for most to whom it comes, this is the turning point of their lives. This, however, is not to say that a snobbish disregard for the Sacraments is conceived in the soul, or that the fellowship of the Christian community is despised, or yet that the soul slips into an attitude of indifference towards the Bible. On the contrary, all these are enriched by prayer, lighting up and assuming a new meaning. In prayer, too, we see the interdependence of these various elements. Men and women are loved and understood more deeply by means of the love and light which are found in prayer; the unlovable become objects of a strange attraction, Christ's disguises. The Blessed Sacrament begins to take its place as the centre of life, not only for the individual, but the whole community, as the means of life, simply because it is in prayer that the Christ who gives Himself on the altar becomes more loved and more clearly known. Similarly, the Bible, especially if heard in the Daily Offices, slowly assumes a value and a preciousness it never had before, largely, one imagines, because of the experimental knowledge and confirmation of its promises given in prayer. In short, this solitary prayer becomes what Pope Gregory said of contemplation, "the engine of the soul," and by the power that flows from this intercourse the soul's entire life is slowly supernaturalized. It ceases to be strictly moral, and sheds that earthy heaviness which marks and mars the strictly moral life. There takes place what Niebuhr described as "a transvaluation of values," in which the values of the world are almost literally turned upside down. Something of the nonsense of the Sermon on the Mount creeps into the soul, producing in its actions, by the kindling of love, a sometimes reckless disregard for its own dear rights. Yet every time it suffers loss, it knows it has drawn nearer to that final joy which touches it so fleetingly and tantalizingly in its daily solitary prayer.

Thus serious prayer begins with the realization that it is an art, in the sense that a great deal is known about it, and that progress demands the observance of certain rules, discovered by those who have gone furthest in its practice.

And the first of these, beyond any doubt, is sufficient time. "We learn," says Dom John Chapman in his Spiritual Letters, "that communion with God is conditioned by solitude and by length of time" —spent in prayer. And though this is so hard for the layman to find, it must be found if progress is to be made. Indeed, we may look no further than this simple fact that many Christians spend so little time in it for the explanation of the painful truth that they do not make progress in sanctity. Why so little time is given is due, one supposes, partly to lack of teaching by the clergy, but much more

to the prevalence of a strong tradition that the proper time for prayer is before going to bed. Prayer, however, is a strenuous affair, and demands above all a clear mind and a relatively untired body—which we do not have at that time. Not that prayer is pre-eminently an intellectual activity, but simply that a tired mind or body will prevent the soul from attending to God as it ought. Most housewives would probably find some time before tea the best hour; most men, on the other hand, some time after tea or before the evening meal, at any rate before the activities of the evening begin. Obviously there are difficulties; but whatever course is adopted, a certain amount of gentle violence will have to be exerted if eternity is to be given precedence over the claims of the daily routine, although once a time for prayer has been established little difficulty will be found in keeping to it.

And there are two further rules which take precedence over all systems however venerable—namely, that "we should pray as we can and not as we can't," and pray much—how much depending on our work and generosity.

Given, then, the necessary time for prayer, the soul can begin to advance in it, though no two souls will ever advance in quite the same way. All, however, are alike in certain respects. Thus, to quote a useful pamphlet, "all growth in prayer is growth in simplicity," which, to mention nothing else, is the basis of Christian conduct and manners. Similarly, all growth in prayer is growth towards a more single love of God. Again, all experience a curious ebb and flow of pleasure in prayer, producing in the soul at one period a strong desire for prayer, and at another an extreme distaste for it. This makes it necessary, if the soul is to persevere, that it should set its will with a naked loving intent upon God, so that the times of sweetness do not make it unhealthily introspective or careless through overmuch elation, nor the times of weariness cause it to give up. God must be served for Himself alone, not for His gifts, and to this end a safe rule is to disregard as far as possible all fluctuations of feeling which assail the soul.

Thus prayer begins, according to tradition, with a serious attempt at meditation—that is to say, a slow pondering of some biblical truth, some word of Christ or event in His life, so that the mind may be able to get inside it and grasp its inner meaning, the object being not to increase one's knowledge of the Bible, which is not by itself an aid to sanctity, but to kindle the affections towards whatever truth is pondered, in such a way that the will is moved to translate into action what is realized in the mind. For "the intellect," says St Bernard (Ser. XLI), "discharges for the soul functions analogous to those which the neck performs for the body, since it is through the intellect that spiritual food passes into the soul, and is conveyed to the digestive organs of the will and the affections." The bare principle of the thing is contained in Ps. xxxix, 4: "While I was thus musing, the fire kindled"—*i.e.*, a kindling of the will and the deepest affections through the action of the mind, the process roughly corresponding to the stirring of the will produced by the

sermon which is not primarily an appeal to the emotions. The object of the whole process is not to gain knowledge but to use knowledge to kindle love.

Meditation, however, is only the first stage, and there are many holy souls who have never meditated at all. Sooner or later, usually sooner, almost all souls come to a point where they can no longer use their intellects in prayer. The mind and heart run straight to God, and the time is spent simply gazing and adoring, and renewing the soul in this simple regard for God. The effort to concentrate on a passage of Scripture proves useless, much like trying to read while listening to another person speaking, though the same passage outside prayer may provide the mind with ample food. It is simply a prayer of the affections that the soul has arrived at, a state in which the action of the discursive intellect is inhibited through the flow of the affections. The ebb and flow of sweetness and the sense of God's Presence is very marked, and it is full of distractions, so that constant recourse must be made to vocal prayer, in thanksgiving especially, but also intercession, confession, and petition. Spiritual reading, as Dom John Chapman has pointed out, is also an admirable remedy for these distractions, occupying the wandering volatile imagination as it does, while, if sufficiently unhurried, leaving the soul free to occupy itself with God at a much deeper level. St Teresa leaves it on record (Life, Chap. IV), that for eighteen years, "except after communicating, she never dared to begin to pray without a book," so helpless did she feel at the hands of wandering thoughts. "Often," she says, "the mere fact that I had a book by me was sufficient"—*i.e.*, to prevent them. The soul finds itself borne along on this general confused and loving attention to God, an attention which, though vague, is none the less natural—being caused simply by the sense of God's immensity—and more and more effective in enabling the soul to serve God and respond to the often indistinct calls of charity.

Later, however, these violent alternations of sweetness and dryness cease, and with them the disturbing alternations of elation and dejection. And in many cases the soul enters upon a time of intense unrelieved dryness lasting, occasionally, for years, during which the temptation to abandon prayer is very great. But if the soul goes on, in blind perseverance, making its thanksgiving and intercessions, its confessions of sin and petitions, and afterwards heaving itself up by a blind effort of the will to gaze at the obscure darkness around it, it gradually becomes aware that, somewhere in this darkness, there is what Gregory the Great described as a chink of light, like a tiny slit at the apex of a roof in some lofty unlighted building. And it is to this tiny chink that the soul begins to feel itself drawn. The old familiarity with God ceases, the soul's knowledge of Him becomes obscure but greatly deepened; and beneath it all the will begins to turn itself to God in a deep unwavering desire which persists, almost unfelt, through the whole round of the soul's moods. Gradually the chink of light becomes more distinct, though always obscured by falls into sin, and at times becomes sufficiently bright to cause the soul a painful joy, painful because it cannot grasp the richness of

meaning that seems to be pouring into it through this access of light. And it is this dark, silent beholding of an obscure but growing light, when the mind and imagination and the surface feelings have been calmed, that is called contemplation, or mystical prayer; at any rate it is its true beginning. And from all one reads of the mystical experience of the saints, progress in prayer becomes progress in beholding this light, and the conforming of the whole life to its brightness. There is in this prayer an inability to think, an inability to visualize God with the imagination, and a general calm of the bodily senses. Indeed, any thought or image or awareness of oneself through the five senses is felt as a distinct interruption and break in the soul's experience.

"It dispenses to a great extent," said Bishop Hedly, speaking of contemplation, "with the use of sensible images or pictures in the mind. Instead of pictures, the soul seems overshadowed by a spreading silent sense of something near at hand, vague in outline, colourless and dim. It dispenses with reasoning, or what is called discourse. In the state which is called contemplation, the mind remains steadfast and fixed in one simple gaze. And this intuition is accompanied by ardent love—an intuition by which we gaze upon our last end and only good, not in any abstract way, but as, here and now, our complete joy and perfect bliss." "Thus the distinguishing mark of contemplation is the absence of every kind of image in prayer. And this contemplative faculty is intuitive rather than logical in its methods. It knows by communion, not by observation." And as in affective prayer, the test of its reality and worth is the readiness with which we return to fulfil our ordinary obligations to our neighbour and Christ's Body. "In the union of the soul with God," says St Bernard, "the Word of God utters no sound but penetrates; it is not full of words but of power; it strikes not on the ear but caresses the heart; the form of its face is not defined, and it does not touch the eyes of the body, but it makes glad the heart, not with charm of colour, but with the love it bestows."

Such contemplation is a continually deepening experience of the incomprehensible certainty of God going on for years—God more and more loved and felt in the soul, but somehow, because of His brightness, more obscure; an experience of a huge uncircumscribed Light filling the soul and mind without allowing itself to be defined or clearly conceived. God wholly envelops us in light, prayer consisting of an intense and loving rest in this light, continually and peacefully, so that we may engage the more readily in necessary works of love—"the mutual joyous content between God and the free and humble man, which is the root of charity and all holiness in the inner life."

This, then, is the substance of contemplative prayer and the normal development of a life of Christian prayer. It is not the highest state of prayer, but certainly that in which most who pray pass most of their lives when they reach it. The supreme experience of an immediate, apparently almost naked, sight of God, such as came to St Augustine, St Paul, and perhaps Moses, is something

which God grants to whom He will; no perseverance on our part can ensure we shall receive it. But contemplative prayer, such as is here described, is open to all Christians of goodwill, and by no means the privilege of the leisured or the learned or enclosed. Indeed, it was the opinion of St Augustine and St Bernard that the mixed life of contemplation and labour is actually easier and higher than the contemplative life as such, in which prayer is the dominant element. What is required for such contemplation is not a special type of mind or temperament—the most unlikely subjects have progressed very far—but goodwill, deep love, and perseverance; and above all, the initial determination to do violence to one's natural inclinations and make time in one's day for such serious prayer.

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SCOUTING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EVANGELISM

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Nobody in Scouting objects to criticism, but to be effective criticism must be fair. Mr Levinge's article in your August issue seems to us to be unfair in some respects. He misrepresents what he calls "the philosophy behind Scouting" because he thinks it is a thing complete in itself, which it was never intended to be.

He does not remind his readers that Baden-Powell wrote *Scouting for Boys* in order to suggest to existing organizations certain additional ideas for training boys. It was only when the existing organizations neglected to take up his ideas and when thousands of boys took them up on their own account, that B.-P. was forced to give up his career in the Army and start the Scout Movement.

It was immediately apparent to him that a religious policy was necessary, and he agreed the terms of such a policy with the heads

of all the leading religious denominations. From 1910 onwards, the first paragraph of that policy has read: "It is expected that every Scout shall belong to some religious denomination and attend its services."

It is clear, then, that it is the aim of the Scout Movement that every boy should belong to a "religious denomination," and obtain his religious teaching from that denomination, however difficult it may be to be successful in that policy in days when the great majority of boys and their parents are attached to no religious denomination.

The fifth paragraph of the religious policy of Scouting, which was added at the suggestion of our Religious Advisory Panel a few years ago, reads: "In the case of a Scout not now attached to any Church, the Scouter should endeavour to put him in touch with the Church to which his parents belong or in which he was baptized. It is, in any case, desirable that every unattached Scout should be brought in touch with a religious denomination. In this matter the approval of the Scout's parents must be obtained." It is, therefore, quite misleading for Mr Levinge to suggest that "religion was to be for Scouting the accident and not the form of its make-up."

But the Scout method has spread, at the demand of the boys of the world, to all nations and religions, and the Christian Church cannot claim the patent rights. The wording of religious policy and so forth must, therefore, be in general terms, but its fulfilment can be just what the individual vicar makes it. Mr Levinge recognizes this in his last paragraph.

There are over 4,000 Scout Groups in this country which are sponsored by Churches, and the incumbent is the Sponsoring Authority and responsible for the religious training of his Scouts. We know by experience, and Mr Levinge seems to agree, that where the Sponsoring Authority and the Scoutmaster work in partnership for that Troop (to use Mr Levinge's own words), "religion is the *esse* of Scouting and its *sine qua non*."

But in days when most boys are outside the reach of the Churches, Scouting cannot confine its activities to Church boys, and there are in this country about 5,000 open Scout Groups. We are in full agreement with Mr Levinge that "it is, of course, much better to have had even the training supplied by an 'open' Troop than none at all." If the Church could offer us many thousands more of young Christian leaders, we know that Scouting could be a great instrument of evangelism. But as, up to the present, the Church cannot make this offer, we must do the best we can with the leaders we have. The fact that the numbers in the Scout Movement have increased by 58,000 in the last two years, so that there are now more boys in the Movement than ever before, seems to show that the boys of this generation ask for Scouting as much as their fathers did in B.-P.'s day.

Yours faithfully,

J. F. COLQUHOUN,
Chairman, Religious Panel,
The Boy Scouts Association.

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MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND BELIEF IN A TRANSCENDENT GOD

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

If Mr Waterfield will re-read his own letter carefully he will observe that, despite the reference to "this belief" in line 4, no mention is made whatsoever of the chief theme of the article in question —*i.e.*, belief in a *transcendent* God—not even in the quotation from Jung which he appends by way of evidence and which is really concerned with the efficiency of the Jungian technique. What, however, is one to think of a quotation such as the following, which is taken (I believe) from *The Psychology of the Unconscious*: "Every man has eyes and all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, cold, and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence of such from empirical necessity. On the contrary there was need of a fantastic, indestructible optimism and one far removed from all sense of reality, in order, for example, to discover in the shameful death of Christ really the highest salvation and the redemption of the world. Thus one can indeed withhold from a child the substance of earlier myths, but not take from him the need for mythology. One can say that should it happen that all the traditions in the world were cut off with a single blow, then, with the succeeding generation, the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again," etc.

I do not wish to pin Mr Waterfield down to any particular quotation, since, after all, psychologists, like theologians and even archbishops, say many things in the course of a lifetime. My real point arose from the general drift of Jung's arguments, and these I still maintain have no relevance to the belief in a *transcendent* God, which is not the same thing, incidentally, as believing in an archetypal pattern. I can only repeat that the sole arguments which seem to me relevant are the medieval, as I tried to make clear. With regard to Mr Waterfield's concluding remarks, I should like to say that theology, like all sciences, uses logic *as a tool* in dealing with its subject-matter, of which, undoubtedly, psychological material forms part. To that extent theology is still based on logic and will be as long as the world lasts.

I am, Yours, etc.,

F. MCEACHRAN.

SHREWSBURY SCHOOL,
SHREWSBURY.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRISTIANITY AND FEAR: A STUDY IN HISTORY AND IN THE PSYCHOLOGY AND HYGIENE OF RELIGION. By Oscar Pfister, Pastor in Zürich and Corresponding member of the Vienna *Verein für Psychiatrie und Neurologie*, translated by W. H. Johnston. Allen and Unwin. 30s.

The German original of this book, Dr Pfister's psychological and theological testament, as he himself says, was published in Zürich in

1944 and was, naturally enough, very little known in this country. We owe to Mr Johnston a clear and competent translation, itself a considerable piece of work, and a great improvement on some of the translations in which earlier psycho-analytic work, including at least one of Pfister's own, has been presented to us. The book itself is of a size adequate to its theme, and is the fruit of a very long and full pastoral experience, supported by wide and critical theological reading.

Its method is, in principle, simple. It is, explicitly, an exposition of one of the most striking and most accurately phrased psychological statements in the New Testament: "There is no fear in love; the perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath torment. He who feareth is not made perfect in love." Pfister's case is summed up in his comment that fear is here regarded as due to disturbances of love and that these, in most instances, are inhibitions of love. The first part of the book is therefore devoted to a detailed analysis of fear and dread (carefully distinguished and defined) and of their relation to love, which is conceived on Freudian lines. The whole section is abundantly illustrated from actual case-material, and it is interesting to see how effectively, as well as loyally, Pfister has combined the functions of pastor and analyst. The second part is a historical outline working out in detail the ways in which the influence first of fear and then of the love which counters fear has shown itself in the successive forms of Hebrew and Christian religion. The third deals with what Pfister calls the Hygiene of Fear, covering in effect the pastoral treatment of all the compulsions, repressions, and anxieties due to the "ever-present imminence of guilt" conscious and unconscious. "In many cases depth psychology must first remove the inhibitions caused by repressions," but the curative factor is love and the goal is love. And this love, *agape*, is something very far removed from the satisfied and shallow "rentier attitude" of the Enlightenment, which has called so much modern religion into disrepute. It is heroic, stern, active, and enduring, and, above all, free, and it is one with faith. "Faith, correctly understood, is love reduced to an intellectual form, while love is the living practice of faith."

Many things about the book are significant. The most obvious is that Pfister, making full use, as he does, of Freudian conceptions, is wholly free from any slavish acceptance of his conclusions about religion or about ethical principles. It is only fair to Freud to add that the broad personal conception of love which is central to Pfister's thesis is wholly in line with Freud's meaning. Freud is by no means a pan-sexualist in the sense which most of his critics and some of his followers have assumed. A further noteworthy point is the emphasis here laid upon fear, a return to Petronius, Sidis, and Rivers which is perhaps overdue. The theologian and historian may perhaps be critical of some of the generalizations in the second part of the book, but this must be read in the light of its main purpose, and the analysis which, after all that critical scholarship can do, wholly identifies the "father-religion" of Jesus with love, will bear and repay the most exacting scrutiny. A final most significant conclusion is that

there can be no one generally binding type of piety. "Christianity has reflected all too clearly the individual and collective neuroticizations of the faithful." The answer, confirmed by depth analysis, is that no one interpretation of Christ, no one orthodoxy, can provide an answer. "It is Christ himself, and not dogmas and learned definitions, who furnishes the standards by which Christian love as a religious force is to be measured."

OXFORD. L. W. GRENSTED.

KARL BARTH, ETUDE SUR SA METHODE DOGMATIQUE. By Jérôme Hamer, O.P. Desclée de Brouer, Paris.

The gravamen of the criticism which Father Hamer pursues throughout his exhaustive examination of Barth's Dogmatics is indicated in the sub-title of his book. The Barthian method is, he contends, that of a "theological occasionalism." That is to say, Barth presents divine revelation as in no sense a continuous process, but as a succession of divine acts which appear and disappear because they are identical with the person and the presence of the free sovereign God. In other words, revelation never detaches itself from the being of God Himself, never passes into human knowledge and experience, never becomes a datum, never makes itself concrete in a sum of truths and understandings after the manner of a direct communication of divine knowledge; and therefore it remains powerless to illumine the mind and to enrich the spirit of man. Under such conditions, Hamer contends, revelation becomes an impossibility both from the side of God and man. On its divine side faith becomes a divine gift which is constantly being withdrawn, and on its human side an act of purely irrational decision and choice. Thus, according to Hamer, the three governing principles of all Barth's thought are: first, the active and discontinuous character of the Word of God; second, the mysterious character of that Word, the fact that even in the event of revelation man gains no real knowledge of it; and third, the *credo quia absurdum*, the fact that man chooses to believe out of his own will and without having any grounds on which his faith could rest. Revelation is never really given and never really received.

It is clear, then, that the validity of Hamer's criticism of Barth's theological work hinges on his understanding of this "occasionalism." Is it the case that Barth's thought is so governed by the idea of God's freedom and sovereignty that revelation, according to him, must consist in a number of acts of the divine will essentially unrelated and capricious, so that man is now raised by the event of revelation into the light of the divine knowledge only to be forthwith left again to the darkness of his own fallen nature wherein the knowledge of God cannot reach him? Hamer surely fails to do justice to the all-governing insistence of Barth that the sovereignty of God is not sovereignty *per se*, but the sovereignty of grace, and that grace is no

mere disposition on the part of God to man which might indeed be "occasional," but an "inner being and self-relation of God Himself"—something, that is, which constitutes His very life and being and which therefore determines all His relations and decisions. Revelation is certainly an event, a breach in the continuity of human experience, but its character as event does not allow a man to fall back upon himself. On the contrary it places him within a believing community whose inner spiritual life and activity is characterized by recollection of revelation once received and expectation of revelation to come. Thus man advances from faith to faith, and in this advance Christ, who is the abiding content of his faith, ever comes to meet him. This very advance is itself conditioned by the event of revelation so that in it Christ is continuously present.

Considerations of space do not permit of a thorough-going discussion of Hamer's insistence that revelation, to be such, must of necessity be direct communication, something which detaches itself from the person of the revealer and passes into man's possession and in a sense under his control; nor can we examine in detail Hamer's contention that Barth's attempt to demonstrate the reality of indirect communication, in which God is always the subject and never the object of revelation, breaks down. If, however, we are justified in holding that Hamer misconceives Barth's "occasionalism," the presumption remains strong that the underlying contention of the reality of indirect communication has not been effectively overthrown. It remains to pay tribute to the wide knowledge and the grace and lucidity of style which make Hamer's book a valuable contribution to theological discussion. It is, moreover, a signal illustration of the fact, which Hamer thankfully admits, that owing to the influence of Barth's work, real speech between Catholicism and Protestantism has become a possibility.

Exeter. F. W. Camfield.

The Theology of Martin Luther. By H. H. Kramm. James Clarke. 10s. 6d.

The first section of Dr Kramm's useful and illuminating volume is entitled "Luther and Lutheranism," and it aptly describes his book. Here is the Lutheran Luther, not by any means the whole Luther nor, some of us may feel, the most attractive or instructive Luther, but certainly a genuine Luther and seriously to be reckoned with. In expounding to English readers what Lutheranism has made of Luther, Dr Kramm has rendered great service, and his innumerable quotations from Lutheran formularies ("By definition and law a Lutheran is a Christian who accepts the Augsburg confession") and Lutheran history from the time of Luther to the modern Church struggle will be of real help to all who are concerned with the ecumenical movement, not least to those who are puzzled by certain clerical tendencies and doctrinal rigidities in some modern Lutheranism which at first sight seem wholly alien to the spirit of Luther.

It is a brave thing to accomplish a book in another tongue than one's own, and it must seem ungenerous to cavil at the English of this volume, but because we hope that Dr Kramm will give us more books, and because there are likely to be other books on Luther by foreign scholars in England, it must be pointed out that a little extra care and advice could have made this a much more readable and accurate account. The irritating colloquialisms, the "rather" and "quite a lot of" which are intriguing in spoken discourse blur theological description: here the Fall is invariably described as "the lapse," while lack of feel for our technical vocabulary results in the description of "concupiscence" as "evil lust" (Art. IX of the 39 Articles offers at least four better translations), and of the Epistle of James as being, in Luther's view, "a dangerous and bad book." Now and again sentences become almost unintelligible.

It is not easy to treat Luther's theology in formal categories, but Dr Kramm valiantly treats the Doctrine of Man, Salvation, the Church, Eschatology, Luther and the Bible, Church and State in successive chapters, and these are embellished with many hundreds of references to the Weimar edition of Luther, references which, taken up, will take the reader deep into Luther's thought. It seems a pity that Dr Kramm, seeking to make Luther intelligible to the English, should use "by grace alone" (*sola gratia*) for his constant description of the cardinal doctrine of "justification by faith" (he can be defended, though the difficulty with *sola gratia* is that it could be used to cover St Augustine, Peter Lombard, and the Council of Trent), but at least he does expound the doctrine of *sola fide* in a way which clears away some endemic English misapprehension. Perhaps the most valuable chapter is that on Luther and the Bible, which is lucid and informative. Less satisfactory, rather "bitty," is the treatment of Church and State, and we could have wished some inkling could have been given of the subtlety and profundity of Luther's doctrine of earthly authority and of the Christian vocation such as we have had in recent years from Tornvall and Wingren in Sweden. It was not perhaps a happy thought to defend Luther's *pecca fortiter* to Englishmen with the illustration of war, and readers had better turn hastily to Julius Hare's exposition of Luther in that regard. The equally unfortunate sentence (p. 67), "Judges and tribunals cannot be governed by the Gospel principle of forgiveness of sins: they are in the sphere of law," is defensible in an exposition of Luther only when supplemented by the fact that for Luther God is the author of "both kinds of righteousness" and that both are summed up in the doctrine of love.

Gordon Rupp.

Richmond, Surrey.

Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas. By F. J. Shirley. S.P.C.K. 14s. 6d.

This tightly packed volume has many excellences. The author tells us that its writing has been interrupted by "the busy and

exacting duties of a headmaster and residentiary canon," and this, combined with the fact that the author was formerly a barrister, accounts for the fact that again and again the book is given a contemporary reference, while it is crowned by a final chapter in which the author attempts "to put myself into Hooker's place, and to deduce what he would think of the Church of England to-day." Would that he could have put himself into Hooker's prose also, but in default of that Dr Shirley covers a great field in crisp and workmanlike fashion. The book is notable, first, for its full and convincing examination of the Seventh Book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* and the suggested interpolations by John Gauden. Dr Shirley confesses: "I set out from the Anglo-Catholic position . . . but I confess I became obliged to conclude that Hooker is not properly to be regarded as a High Anglican. . . . I cannot accept the Seventh Book as genuine Hooker, though, doubtless, much of it is." The evidence for these conclusions is fully set out in Chapters II and III. It is a pity that Dr Shirley should begin his description of Law and authority in Hooker with an account of the Reformers, for here he confuses Luther's early description of the "synteresis" with Luther's doctrine of "Natural Law." Had the Reformers believed about the law of nature what Dr Shirley supposes them to believe, there would have been no reason whatever for their long hesitation in giving an opinion about the divorce of Henry VIII. And though Dr Shirley follows Hooker himself in paying tribute and drawing parallels between Hooker and St Thomas, yet in fact Hooker lacks that subtle interpenetration of natural by supernatural which modern Thomistic investigation has stressed, with the result that Hooker's treatment of Natural Law is perhaps almost Occamistic rather than Thomist, and becomes something from which Locke could extract a secular philosophy of politics (something Locke could never have done with St Thomas?). There follows a lucid chapter on Church and State, and in successive chapters an informative account on the literature about the "Right to Resist," an important literature which perhaps nobody has yet succeeded in making other than dull, though the "Hitler Bomb Plot of 1944" showed it to be by no means out of relevance. The last chapter, which brings Hooker into the present, is likely to prove the most "dated" in a few years, but it is as noteworthy as a commendable refusal to allow discussions of sixteenth-century political theory to remain remote and aloof from our present concerns. Those who agree with Hooker's kind of Anglicanism will rejoice to claim him as supporter for their own estimate of the genius of Anglicanism. Those who do not will no doubt skip still more eagerly from the Maginot line of history and tradition into the safe refuge of the "tunnel" period of the second century. All will be wise not to ignore this work of sound learning, ripe wisdom, and practical exposition.

Gordon Rupp.

Richmond, Surrey.

Christianity and Communism. By John C. Bennett. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

Communism, Capitalism, and Christianity. By Emil Brunner. Lutterworth Press. 1s. 6d.

They are bold men who write books on Communism and Christianity, because once one denies oneself the simple function of merely insulting Communists after the fashion of Mr Calwell, the Australian Minister of Immigration and Information, who, in August, was reported as describing them as ". . . pathological exhibits . . . human scum . . . paranoiacs, degenerates, morons, bludgers . . . pack of dingoes . . . industrial outlaws and political lepers . . . ratbags . . . whom Stalin wouldn't even use for manure"—once one forbears this luxury, the issues are frightfully complicated. Words like "Communism," "Christianity," like the word "Democracy," cover so much and permit such diverse interpretation; both have doctrinal theories that are hardly recognizable in the practices and way of life they engender, and both have developed and suffered many accretions in the process. Dr Bennett evidences this complexity at the beginning of his book in saying that "Communism as a faith and as a system of thought is a compound of half-truth and positive error, that Communism as a movement of power is a threat to essential forms of personal and political freedom, and that it is a responsibility of Christians to resist its extension in the world. On the other hand, the writer believes that the errors of Communism are in large part the result of the failure of Christians, and of Christian Churches, to be true to the revolutionary implications of their own faith."

Dr Bennett wrestles deeply with the issues between Christianity and Communism in a fair and dispassionate manner. The chief value of his book is the first half, where he skilfully lays bare the errors, from a Christian point of view, of Marxist doctrine—*e.g.*, its over-simple prophecy of the development of Capitalism, its Utopianism concerning the State and the perfectibility of man, its infallibility with all that that unpleasant word means for heretics. The snag (unduly touched on in this book) is that Communism (as politicians know better than theologians) is much more than a philosophy and doctrine, with a Holy Writ subject to devastating higher criticism from its opponents. It is also a dynamic political creed, capable of embodiment in great and small nations, and however rough and brutal its methods and autocratic its regimes, apparently capable of maintaining a workable society to the satisfaction of the many. In spite of his call to Christians to discover the "revolutionary implications of their own faith," Dr Bennett cannot with enthusiasm show Christians an alternative. He is aware of the failures of capitalist countries to meet the demands of Christian standards; rather hesitantly he says that democratic Socialism offers no panacea and tends to concentrate power in the State. Indeed, he goes on to say that "it might well be deduced from all that I have said about economic systems that Christians will serve society best, not by advocating any system as such or by condemning any system

as such, but by helping the community to be sensitive to the human consequences of all systems and by calling the attention of each society to the special dangers that accompany the system dominant within it. . . ." Of course, Christians should always fulfil this discerning, critical function, but much more is required if Christians are to play a positive, creative part as architects of society, or are concerned to change the political ordering of their country. Christians have to say yes to some political program before they can start saying no. One would have liked Dr Bennett to have been more positive about those "creative solutions which never allow either justice or freedom to destroy the other," to use the words of Section 3 report of Amsterdam, of which he was secretary. And an Englishman would like to ask him a few questions about British Socialism.

Dr Brunner's thesis is not unlike that of Dr Bennett. He is, however, emphatic that Protestantism should join with the Roman Catholic Church in saying an unequivocal No to Communism—he also urges a No (but a smaller one) to Capitalism. Presumably a No is also said to all the democracies of the West who are "on the way to the total State." Between the two extremes, we are told, lie many possibilities in which the coercive function of the State must be reduced in favour of a restoration of groups and institutions anterior to the State, and which must recover the "meaning they ought to have according to the divine order of creation" (presumably the family, the churches, the professional corporations, and industrial unions, etc.). As Dr Brunner says, where this development is in operation, as for example in his own country, the best results are obtained and the sting taken out of Communists and State-Socialist tendencies. But, alas, most of the world is not like Switzerland, and alas, too, Christians are supposed to do something about politics.

Sheffield. E. R. Wickham.

Christianity and the Modern World View. By H. A. Hodges. Viewpoints No. 13. S.C.M. Press. 2s. 6d.

The S.C.M. Press has rendered many useful services, but few more useful than the publication of this Viewpoint series; it is an inestimable delight and advantage, in these days of high book prices, to be able to buy for half a crown such riches as Professor Jaspers' lectures on "The European Spirit," and now Professor Hodges' essay in a modern critique of the Christian revelation. We have waited long for such a critique which takes account of the profound change in the mode, and even in the structure, of western man's thinking and general sensibility in the last hundred years . . . since Feuerbach openly challenged belief in the existence of God and Nietzsche within fifty years announced God's death. Christian thinkers have been slow . . . lamentably, if not culpably, slow . . . to perceive the significance of modern atheisms: they have too often been content to regard professions of atheism as mere repetitions of man's perennial hubris or self-assertiveness within a universe of

acknowledged order and purpose; they have not remarked the paradoxical relation of such professions with the fact of man's freedom . . . his creation in the image of God as spirit, and his progressive experience of the implications of this through the extension of Christ's redemptive work in history. A Christological interpretation of modern atheism is urgently needed; meanwhile Professor Hodges deserves our warm gratitude for at least stating the need and indicating the lines upon which it may be satisfied.

"Our Christianity is not something which our non-Christian contemporaries have seen and rejected. They have never seen it. We have failed to make it visible to them in the first place. . . . Our problem is, therefore, in the first instance, that of making Christianity visible, of making people see it as a really possible way of looking at things. Secondly, we have to try to make it intelligible, so that anyone who sees it as a vision may be able to assure himself that it is not a mirage." The first, says Professor Hodges, is a poet's business; the second is a philosopher's. It is the measure of the Professor's own powers that in setting about the second (for which he is professionally equipped) he should so far achieve the first . . . not so much by the evocation of vivid or apocalyptic images as by his frank and fair statement of all the objections and difficulties to belief in God, his sympathy with the intellectual honesty of modern unbelievers and his compassion for their tragic aimlessness, and above all by his refusal to anticipate the definitive answer. These qualities give this little book a truly "poetic" quality, and do more than any logical apologetic to "make Christianity visible"; while the clarity of exposition and power of reasoning do much to "make it intelligible."

Those who read these six short chapters when they first appeared as supplements in the *Christian News-Letter* will be glad to possess them in permanent form; those who did not should hasten to repair the omission by buying the book at once.

St. Anne's House,
London.

Patrick McLaughlin.

Marcion and his Influence. By E. C. Blackman. London. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

Any serious study of so important a figure as Marcion must be welcome to scholars, and Mr Blackman has produced a book which students of the early Church will do well to possess. His method is to pass under review opinions, ancient and modern, that have been held about the varied influence of Marcion and to appraise their value. Obviously, the notable study of Marcion by Harnack comes in for special attention. The worth of Mr Blackman's book will best be appreciated not so much in continuous reading as in consultation for special points.

It will be readily agreed with Mr Blackman that Harnack overemphasized the influence of the man to whom he gave such detailed

attention, and in particular in regard to the Canon of the New Testament. It must be remembered that it was the pressure upon the Church not only of the Marcionite heresy but also of the Gnostic claim generally to possess a secret tradition of its own that induced the Church to bring forth and lay emphasis upon those writings of apostles and apostolic men that it already treasured. Again, there seems to be reason to think that long before Marcion appeared a collection of Pauline Epistles had been made and was in circulation; so that what Marcion issued was a revised edition of this, as he had also done with the Gospel according to St Luke. Mr Blackman's discussion of this matter is learned and judicious, if not always as clear and easily followed as we should like. His footnote about *Hebrews* on p. 35 needs correction. The epistle was not yet recognized as Pauline at Rome at the end of the fourth century: in the East, however, Origen believed it to be Pauline, and quotes from it as by St Paul, but he held that the actual words were written by somebody else.

If, as we hope it will, Mr Blackman's book draws fresh attention to Marcion, this will be all to the good. For Marcion has a curiously modern appearance about him. He did not indulge in the fantastic cosmic speculations favoured by the other Gnostics, and he eschewed the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures. And he emphasized with a real moral earnestness the ethical aspect of religion. The Church rightly rejected his dualism and his attitude to the Old Testament Scriptures. But he posed a question which has a relevance to every age, and not least to ours when the unity of the Bible is being laid stress on. What is the relationship of the Law to the Gospel? It is well to be reminded that the answer is not so simple as Marcion or his opponents thought it to be.

Trinity College,
Dublin.

J. E. L. Oulton.

Psychology and the Parish Priest. By Lindsay Dewar. Mowbrays. 5s.

Big themes are handled in this little book, and the author would be among the first to say that it can be only a preface to the subject. The book offers "an outline of the psychological principles specially applicable to the day-to-day work of the parish priest." It is "not concerned with pastoralia as a whole. It deals with the psychological aspect of the pastoral work of the clergy." The four chapters discuss "Preaching and the Conduct of Divine Worship," work "In the Parish," "Dealing with Individuals," and "Some Special Problems" (mostly matrimonial).

The author's method is to take "a few broad psychological principles" as sufficient to give us "the guidance we need," and to re-examine the parson's parochial duties in the light of these. Paramount in his treatment is suggestion, the definition of which is crucial to his treatise. "Etymologically it means, 'to bring in from

underneath,' and that is what suggestion does. It brings into the mind an idea, or an emotion, or a desire, beneath the level of the critical judgment. In suggestion the critical reason is by-passed" (p. 11). Accordingly, in preaching we are to avoid arguments and to appeal to the emotional and conative aspects of the mind, in visiting we are to keep clear of controversy, and in all our activities we are to cultivate "confidence," to "believe in" what we are doing. When we wish to say that a person is healed by faith, we may say, "if we prefer, by suggestion" (p. 42). Prayer in general "is, from the psychological point of view, an exercise in auto-suggestion" (p. 46). Such observations will be competent to provide us with fresh ways of understanding our business and of appreciating the human qualities of those committed to our care. But they are incapable of informing us what that business is or what people are. They are no substitute for a theology. We should have welcomed earlier the admission which Canon Lindsay Dewar reserves for his "Postscript": "It is indeed true that psychology is counted but a vain thing to save a man" (p. 119).

Occasionally the general directions which may appear unassailable in theory will require modification in practice. We are told that the parish priest should be seen "walking" (p. 44); few clergy actually engaged in parish work could do their work at that speed. We are warned against "the modern slovenliness in dress characteristic of some priests" (p. 20); not seldom this may be an accommodation to the dress of one's people or the pence in one's pocket. Generalizations regarding the vicarage garden and publicity (which sound like echoes of the 1945 report on evangelism) may require to be similarly trimmed by the clergymen on the spot.

Goring-by-Sea. W. W. S. March.

SHORTER NOTICES

The Biblical Doctrine of the Church. By William Robinson. The Bethany Press. $2.50.

The wheel of discussion of the doctrine of the Church comes full circle—almost, but not quite, for the stone of stumbling of the Ministry prevents any easy turning of the last angle, and many of us believe that stone to be fundamental to the structure of the Church. It has become a commonplace observation that critical biblical studies, largely a product of Reformation individualism, have brought us back to a renewed understanding of the corporate content of revelation, to the indivisibility of gospel and church. These lectures, delivered in America two years ago, are a particularly interesting example of this trend. Professor William Robinson speaks as a member of one of the smaller and later sects, the Disciples of Christ, which under its corporate title, the Churches of Christ, reveals rather more of its markedly Catholic temper.

In the all too short space of four lectures, expanded by some appendices and notes, Professor Robinson expounds a full-blooded biblical doctrine of the Church. Here it is made clear that the New Testament, and not St Augustine, began the identification of the Church and the Kingdom, that the Body of Christ is no merely metaphorical description of the Church, that in Baptism and the Eucharist Christians are in reality united with Christ and one another. The latter half of the book is devoted to a more general discussion of the nature of the Church, its place in the world, its unity and its ministry. The treatment suffers from its brevity; though the author discusses various recent books on these subjects, such as Fr Hebert's *The Form of the Church*, he does not really come to grips with Fr Hebert's fundamental question of the relation of the Spirit and the form of the Church. Professor Robinson begins his biblical exposition with the prologue of the Fourth Gospel and ends it with a discussion of 1 John, in each case making clear the nature of the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation. It would have been more interesting if the second part of the book had been tied more closely to the exposition of the first part and faced the contention of Hoskyns that the doctrine of the Church and the Ministry of St Ignatius follows not only historically but theologically from the teachings of the Johannine writings.

J. H. Churchill.

Tottenham.

God and Man in the Old Testament. By George Whitfield. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

The Headmaster of Stockport School has produced a readable little book on the religious ideas of the Old Testament. It is designed to be used as a textbook for higher forms in schools, and would also be useful for adult study groups. Its most commendable feature is its copious and well set-out use of Old Testament quotations. The arrangement of the book in intellectual "topic" form will commend itself to many, while for others it will confirm a belief that "topics" have their limitations: there is a good deal of repetition of matter without producing greater illumination. Perhaps it is that the Old Testament has only one topic, what Canon Phythian-Adams has called the Divine History. Mr Whitfield has some useful theological and historical instruction to give, but the book lacks the cohesion and penetration which a more historical approach can give.

Tottenham. J. H. Churchill.

Essentials of Demonology. By Edward Langton. Epworth Press. 15s.

Few things are more important for the student both of the New Testament and of the first days of the Christian Church than an understanding of the mental outlook of the world to which the Gospel was preached. It is, of course, a commonplace that this

mental outlook included a belief in angels and demons, spirits good and bad, and, by New Testament times, in a comprehensive hierarchy of demons, with Satan as the great antagonist. But the full history and complexity of such beliefs, both Jewish and Hellenistic, are not always recognized, and Dr Langton, already well known as an expert in this field, has set himself to the laborious task of tracing the story in detail through a maze of primitive Semitic evidence, leading on to the Old Testament and the later Talmudic and Apocryphal sources.

The result is not, as some readers might anticipate, a book of mystery and horror, such as some writers on medieval devil-worship and witchcraft have produced, but a most readable and scientific account of a curious, varied, and by no means consistent collection of beliefs, which formed, in fact, the earliest attempt at a serious solution of the problem of evil. It was natural enough that this solution should be stated in vivid imagery, and not in abstract terms, and the figures of Lilith, Azazel, Keteb, Belial, Satan, and the rest are a testimony to the realism with which the problem was felt and faced. Modern psychology has made us familiar with this primitive mode of mental process, and has enabled us to treat it with the respect which it really deserves.

Dr Langton has not ventured into detailed questions of scholarship in regard to the many sources which he has used. To do so would have been in some cases a long and intricate process. But he has accepted and used to the full the work of such scholars as Dr Charles upon the Apocrypha and the Book of Revelation. He has taken the view that the Apocrypha and Rabbinic literature are evidence for beliefs going back to a very early date, and has used them freely to illustrate his study of the Old Testament material. One point of interest is the small amount of influence which he assigns to Zoroastrian ideas, and here his case seems to be a strong one.

Altogether he has given us a reference book of very great value and interest, and if the excellent plates, mostly from Doré, are not specially relevant, they certainly add colour to a very pleasantly produced book.

L. W. Grensted.

Oxford.

Being and Having. By Gabriel Marcel. Translated by Katharine Farrer. Dacre Press. 10s. 6d.

The western vogue of a doctrine called existentialism has been due perhaps not so much to the intrinsic merit of that doctrine as to the manner adopted for its exposition. The opportunity of apparently imbibing philosophy while absorbed in the adventures of a set of fictitious characters either in the pages of a novel or on the stage of a theatre proved irresistible. And that was the great novelty. Bergson too, early in the century, had invested philosophy with a brief hour of popular glamour. He had been completely incapable

of transcending an openly didactic attitude to his public. But Jean Paul Sartre and his acolyte Simone de Beauvoir not only have come forward in the guise of pure entertainers; there has been, furthermore, the enchantment of their indisputable talent. The chocolate which coated the pill was invitingly toothsome.

Nevertheless, even if only in the second place, the pill itself has had seduction. The primary affirmation of existentialism is that existence precedes essence, and the affirmation ensures that existentialism can be different from other philosophical doctrines. These are theoretic. It alone has claimed to apply directly to the multiplicity and flux of actual human lives and to be concerned with the vicissitudes and aspiration which go to form the drama of each individual person. There lies the secret of its appeal, and that is why the appeal can strike home.

For that reason we should clearly understand that existentialism does not, as with Sartre and his German master, Martin Heidegger, have to issue in atheism. On the contrary, the great Jewish prophets, in having held that "to be" is the act of acts, the act of being whereby an essence is, may be regarded as early existentialists; and when ontology, or the science of being, came to crown the soaring edifice of medieval philosophy, it was because Aquinas has integrated the dogma of the priority of existence in Christian thought.

Thus, as an existentialist, Gabriel Marcel, the French Roman Catholic philosopher, has the advantage over Sartre of being in the ontological tradition, which is biblical and Christian. The present volume is a translation—to all appearances excellent—of *Être et Avoir*, which was first issued in Paris in 1937. In its pages, alas! not only is there no chocolate coating, but the English reader may even suspect that the pill itself has failed to materialize. The truth is that in order to apprehend Marcel's "metaphysic of communion," we need also the books which have followed, *Du Refus à l'Invocation* and *Homo Viator*.

Montgomery Belgion.

Peterborough.

The Religions of the World. By Godfrey E. Phillips. Religious Education Press. 6s.

His Messengers Went Forth. By Julie Chanler. Coward McCann Inc. $1.75.

Dr Phillips' book is the first of a new series of Gateway Handbooks of Religious Knowledge, edited by Dr Basil Yeaxlee and intended for use in schools, training colleges and University Departments of Education, as well as for the general reader. In 156 pages it expounds with fairness and lucidity the main ideas and practices of Animism and of the developed religions of mankind other than Christianity—Hinduism with its immanentist and pantheistic tendencies, Buddhism with its message of Painlessness through Life-Negation, Confucianism with its stress on the right ordering of life, and Islam with its grasp of the Sovereignty of God and its sense of

brotherhood. Each chapter ends with some quotations from the sacred writings of the religion described and with a bibliography.

Dr Phillips exposes the impossibility of a comparative study of religions without any presuppositions and makes his own clear. "The standards used in this book," he says, "are the truths given in Christian history, the series of events . . . which began with the Jews, culminated in Jesus Christ, and has flowed onward ever since in His Church, manifesting the nature of God by what He has done" (p. 15). This does not mean labelling one religion as "true" and all others as "false." The impact of Biblical revelation upon a people's life and thought (including those of present-day Christians), he says, has the "double effect of destroying error and quickening truth" (p. 152). "It would be possible to take one by one the main questions about life which at the outset we saw that man has to ask, and after noting the reply, partly good and partly mistaken, given by each religion separately, to show how redemptive history gives an answer which combines all the separate goods in something richer and sets them free from the errors which have limited them" (p. 154). A book to be warmly recommended.

Mrs Chanler's book, intended for boys and girls and their teachers, is a very different cup of tea. In sixty-four generously spaced pages she seeks to record the essential teaching of eight of the world's great religious teachers ranging from Krishna to Jesus, from Zoroaster to her own master, Baha-O-Llah. Differences are ignored and all appear as exponents of the doctrine that if everyone in the world were kind and loving, how kind and loving everyone in the world would be. Thus Jesus "lived for love, died for love, and showed that living and dying are the same, being two parts of the same story—the *eternal love story* of man in the service of man" (p. 45, author's italics). A person who could believe that was the essence of the Gospel could believe anything.

C. Kenneth Sansbury.

Lincoln Theological College
(Scholæ Cancellarii).

Nothing Left to Believe. By Richard Acland. Longmans. 8s. 6d.

I Want to Live. By J. N. Thompson. Mowbrays. 6s.

This Sacramental Universe. By J. W. Woolgar. James Clarke. 12s. 6d.

"Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely believed among us." Each of these three books sets out by a different route, and from a different starting point, to state the Christian belief in terms comprehensible to this generation.

Sir Richard Acland addresses himself to the many who are worried and disappointed or just plain bored because they "have nothing left to believe." He draws attention to the fact, so frequently and dangerously overlooked, that the Church's traditional and hitherto

successful method of proclamatory teaching is out of tune with the minds of this generation. Men are no longer able to accept a proposition on authority alone, without doing violence to the ordinary pattern of their thoughts. The challenge "will not be met simply by proclaiming the faith with increased fervour, nor by wrapping the proclamation in new techniques such as those of the film, the poster and the press advertisement." Our aim should be "to change indifference and closed-mindedness into alert open-mindedness. What happens after that depends on God."

Part I deals with the defence of the Gospel and the Church in our day, and in conflict with rival ideologies. Part II considers social, political, and economic problems, with special reference to democracy and Communism. Part III advises both the seeker after truth and the professed Christian about what they must do. The author leaps lightly over theological obstacles that would daunt the heart of lesser men, but his face is set squarely in the right direction. His book is tonic and stimulating in its effect, forthright without being cocksure. He talks politics some of the time, as he must and ought, but here is no attempt to enlist Christianity on the side of a political party. Many of us will wish to put this book into the hands of those whose faith is insecure, or non-existent, but who seek the truth.

I Want to Live is an effort to answer the questions young people ask about the faith and practice of the Church. It is sound, comprehensive, and straightforward. The fifty-two talks form a useful compendium of Christian teaching in the Catholic tradition. The style is colloquial but, as so often happens, fails to reproduce the effect of the spoken word. This book will be of value for adolescents and adults under instruction for Confirmation.

This Sacramental Universe is in an entirely different category. Accepting the scientific method, the writer points out that religion is a phenomenon that demands to be taken into account. He starts from the "principle of the revelation of the divine through the human, of eternity through history, of the spiritual through the material." Life is a moral-sacramental order, and history the medium of the Christian faith. The facts that show Jesus Christ as the supreme "particular" in history are also teleological. Thus, the "end" of history, its eternal meaning, is disclosed in the historical process. The Eucharist expresses this, revealing the divine grace and providing the means whereby it becomes available. The Church is the embodiment of the universal purpose. Worship is the indispensable alternation to activity, and is the way of unity. The sacramental order is the ground of historical hope, leading to its fulfilment in eternal life.

The author conducts us over a vast estate, sometimes very rapidly. Problems of Holy Order, Biblical criticism, or authority are disposed of in a terse paragraph. Perhaps his reach exceeds his grasp. Statements and claims are made which it would be impossible to substantiate in a book of two hundred pages. Nevertheless, Mr Woolgar succeeds in a task as worth while as it is uncommon: he achieves a massive synthesis, and one that merits our attention.

His book is as original in style as it is in content, and should make a mark on contemporary thought. His writing is both gracious and accurate.

EDWIN S. URWIN.

LIVERPOOL.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS (NASHVILLE, U.S.A.): Halford E. Luccock and Paul Hutchinson, *The Story of Methodism* ($4.00); Elmer T. Clark, *The Small Sects in America* ($3).

ALLEN AND UNWIN: Thomas Hywel Hughes, *The Atonement: Modern Theories of the Doctrine* (15s.).

CHURCH BOOK ROOM PRESS: A. W. Habershon, *The Catechism of the Church of England, Part II* (4s.).

CHURCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY (PHILADELPHIA): J. S. Marshall, *The Genius and Mission of the Episcopal Church* (25 cents); E. H. Eckel, *How We Got our Prayer Book* (25 cents).

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND BOOKROOMS: D. P. Thomson, *Men Christ Wants* (1s.).

EPWORTH PRESS: Leslie F. Church, *More about the Early Methodist People* (12s. 6d.); Edward Wales Hirst, *Morality and God* (6s.); W. F. Lofthouse, *F.H. Bradley* (10s. 6d.); Harold B. Rattenbury, *David Hill, Friend of China* (8s. 6d.); W. E. Sangster, *The Craft of Sermon Construction* (7s. 6d.).

HELIOPOLIS-VERLAG (TÜBINGEN): Hans Ehrenberg, *Goethe der Mensch* (D.M. 6.80).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: Lindsey Dewar, *An Outline of New Testament Ethics* (8s. 6d.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: P. T. Forsyth, *The Soul of Prayer* (5s.).

INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP: R. A. Stewart, *The Earliest Rabbinic Tradition and its Importance for New Testament Study* (1s.).

LONGMANS: Cardinal Mindszenty, *Four Years' Struggle of the Church in Hungary* (5s. paper; 8s. 6d. cloth boards).

LONGMANS (DORCHESTER): William Barnes (Ed. Giles Dugdale), *Poems Grave and Gay* (6s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: H. A. Guy, *Landmarks in the Story of Christianity* (6s.).

MOHR (TÜBINGEN): H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (D.M. 27.00).

NATIONAL SOCIETY AND S.P.C.K.: Donald R. Denman, *First Footprints* (5s.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (NEW YORK): J. W. Suter and G. J. Cleaveland, *The American Book of Common Prayer* (10s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Hugh Ross Williamson, *The Seven Christian Virtues* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: J. Gordon Cox, *A Service of Thanksgiving and Intercession for Health and Healing* (4d.).

THE AUTHOR (17, King's Avenue, Falmouth): Marian L. Wallace, *The Story of the Parish of All Saints, Falmouth* (2s. 6d.).

VANDENHOECK AND RUPRECHT (GÖTTINGEN): J. Jeremias, *Abendmahlsworte Jesu* (D.M. 6.80).

ZWINGLI-VERLAG (ZÜRICH): *Erziehung und Seelsorge* (n.p.); Helene Stokar, *Sonntagsgesetzgebung* (Fr. 6.50); Arthur Rich, *Die Anfänge der Theologie Huldrych Zwinglis* (Fr. 9.80); Ernst Ramp, *Das Zinsproblem: eine historische Untersuchung* (Fr. 7); R. Morgenthau, *Die Lukanische Geschichts-schreibung als Zeugnis* (2 vols.) (Fr. 18.30).

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